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THE UNRELENTING LIBERTARIAN 
CHALLENGE TO PUBLIC 
ACCOMMODATIONS LAW 
Samuel R. Bagenstos* 
There seems to be a broad consensus that Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, which prohibits race discrimination in places of public accommodation, 
was a remarkable success. But the consensus is illusory. Laws prohibiting dis-
crimination by public accommodations currently exist under a significant legal 
threat. And this threat is merely the latest iteration in the controversy over public 
accommodations laws that began as early as Reconstruction. This Essay begins 
by discussing the controversy in the Reconstruction and civil rights eras over the 
penetration of antidiscrimination principles into the realm of private businesses’ 
choice of customers. Although the controversy was discussed in the earlier era in 
terms of civil versus social rights, and in the later era in terms of property, con-
tract, and association, the same fundamental concerns motivated objections to 
public accommodations laws in both periods. The Essay then turns to the current 
controversy. It begins by discussing Rand Paul’s 2010 comments questioning 
whether public accommodations laws are consistent with libertarian principles 
as well as the harsh response those comments drew from prominent libertarian 
commentators. It shows that Paul’s libertarian opponents disagreed with him on-
ly on pragmatic—not principled—grounds. The Essay then turns to an analysis of 
Boy Scouts of America v. Dale and of recent developments that promise to un-
dermine the expressive-commercial distinction that has kept Dale from threaten-
ing the core of public accommodations law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
There seems to be a broad consensus that Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, which prohibits race discrimination in “place[s] of public accommoda-
tion,”1 was a remarkable success. Although Title II triggered the most contro-
versy of all of the bill’s titles as the Civil Rights Act proceeded through Con-
gress—including objections from such notables as Robert Bork2 and William 
Rehnquist3 (pressed in Congress by Senators Barry Goldwater4 and Strom 
Thurmond5)—compliance, it is said, came quickly and easily once the Supreme 
Court upheld the law late in 1964.6 Title II is now the one piece of the Civil 
Rights Act that everyone can support. Even Richard Epstein, in his book argu-
ing for repeal of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (which prohibits employment 
discrimination), offers supportive words for Title II’s prohibition on discrimi-
nation by public accommodations.7 And when a rare voice rises up to object to 
Title II—as Rand Paul did, briefly, while he was a candidate for Senate in 
2010—the reaction is swift and comes equally harshly from left and right.8 Ti-
tle II seems to have traveled far. It began its life as the most controversial anti-
discrimination provision, but it seems to have become the one island of consen-
sus in the highly contentious debate over civil rights laws.9 
 
  1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2012). 
  2. See Robert Bork, Civil Rights—A Challenge, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 31, 1963, at 21, 
21-22. 
  3. See RICK PERLSTEIN, BEFORE THE STORM: BARRY GOLDWATER AND THE UNMAKING 
OF THE AMERICAN CONSENSUS 363 (2001). 
  4. See Christopher W. Schmidt, Defending the Right to Discriminate: The Libertari-
an Challenge to the Civil Rights Movement, in SIGNPOSTS: NEW DIRECTIONS IN SOUTHERN 
LEGAL HISTORY 417, 433-35 (Sally E. Hadden & Patricia Hagler Minter eds., 2013). 
  5. See Linda C. McClain, Involuntary Servitude, Public Accommodations Laws, and 
the Legacy of Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 71 MD. L. REV. 83, 136-41 
(2011). 
  6. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 305 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, 
Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 261-62 (1964). See generally Randall Kennedy, The 
Struggle for Racial Equality in Public Accommodations, in LEGACIES OF THE 1964 CIVIL 
RIGHTS ACT 156, 159 (Bernard Grofman ed., 2000) (“Although Title II was probably the 
most talked about section of the Civil Rights Act, the section about which emotions ran 
highest, the section over which the most blood had been spilled, it quickly faded in signifi-
cance. It became, to paraphrase Hugh Davis Graham, a welcome casualty of success.”). 
  7. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMINATION LAWS 127-28 (1992). 
  8. See infra Part II.A. 
  9. See, e.g., Joseph William Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations 
and Private Property, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1283, 1291 (1996) (asserting that there is a “settled 
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But the consensus is illusory. Notwithstanding the swift reaction to Rand 
Paul’s 2010 comments and Paul’s own backtracking on the issue,10 laws pro-
hibiting discrimination by public accommodations currently exist under a sig-
nificant legal threat. And this threat is merely the latest iteration in the contro-
versy over public accommodations laws that began as early as Reconstruction. 
To be sure, the language in which the controversy is expressed has changed. 
During Reconstruction, opponents of laws prohibiting discrimination by public 
accommodations argued that those laws impermissibly sought to extend equali-
ty beyond the sphere of “civil rights” to the sphere of “social rights.” Two of 
the Supreme Court’s key cases punctuating the end of Reconstruction—the 
Civil Rights Cases11 and Plessy v. Ferguson12—relied on this civil-
rights/social-rights distinction to bless discrimination by public accommoda-
tions.13 By contrast, during the civil rights era, and continuing to today, oppo-
nents have framed their arguments in terms of property, contract, or freedom of 
association rather than in terms of civil rights and social rights. But the underly-
ing concerns have been the same. Since the Reconstruction era, continuing 
through the civil rights era to today, public accommodations laws have trig-
gered legal controversy over the extent to which antidiscrimination principles 
should penetrate into spaces that had at one time been understood as “private” 
or “social.” 
My suggestion that the legal controversy remains ongoing may be surpris-
ing. After all, Plessy is decisively confined to the constitutional anticanon.14 
And the Court has, to be sure, continued to reaffirm the state-action holding of 
the Civil Rights Cases.15 But that decision’s invalidation of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1875 has been completely displaced as a matter of reality—if not doc-
trine—by the Court’s rulings upholding Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
in the McClung and Heart of Atlanta cases. The adoption of the Fair Housing 
Act of 1968,16 and the Court’s subsequent expansive interpretation of Con-
gress’s power to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment in Jones v. Alfred H. May-
er Co.,17 would seem to have entirely laid to rest the civil-rights/social-rights 
 
social consensus” that businesses open to the public should have no right to exclude custom-
ers based on race or sex). 
 10. See infra Part II.A. 
  11. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
  12. 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 13. See Plessy, 163 U.S. at 544, 551-52; The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 22. 
  14. See Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379, 380, 412-17 (2011); 
Richard A. Primus, Canon, Anti-Canon, and Judicial Dissent, 48 DUKE L.J. 243, 244-45 
(1998). 
  15. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 621-22 (2000). 
  16. Pub. L. 90-284, tit. VIII, 82 Stat. 81 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-
3619 (2012)). 
  17. 392 U.S. 409, 437-44 (1968). 
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distinction on which the Civil Rights Cases was based.18 And the harsh reac-
tion—even from leading libertarian legal scholars—to Paul’s comments ques-
tioning Title II makes it appear that even skeptics of civil rights laws are un-
willing to challenge these legal developments. 
But, I shall argue, appearances are deceiving. Although the reaction to 
Paul’s comments shows that skeptics of public accommodations laws are un-
willing to attack Title II itself, the reasons for that unwillingness are essentially 
pragmatic. These skeptics appear to agree that laws prohibiting private busi-
nesses from excluding classes of customers violate libertarian principles, but 
they recognize that a frontal attack on Title II of the Civil Rights Act is a politi-
cal nonstarter.19 Instead, they have sought to retreat to safer political and legal 
ground from which to challenge the expansion of public accommodations laws 
to businesses and bases of discrimination not addressed by Title II.20 This stra-
tegic retreat shows increasing signs of success. The Supreme Court’s decision 
in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale21 offered a tool to challenge public accom-
modations laws as violations of the First Amendment freedom of association. 
Initially, that tool was weakened by the prevailing reading of Dale as limited to 
cases in which a public accommodations law applies to a nonprofit, “expres-
sive” association. That reading has essentially limited Dale to the fringes of 
public accommodations doctrine. It has kept free-association arguments from 
threatening the application of public accommodations law to for-profit com-
mercial businesses. But ongoing legal developments—both in the area of public 
accommodations law itself and in the litigation surrounding the Affordable 
Care Act’s “contraception mandate”22—are poised to undermine this expres-
sive-commercial distinction. If these challenges succeed, Dale’s freedom-of-
association principles will threaten the core of public accommodations law—
including, perhaps, Title II itself. Richard Epstein’s contribution to this Sympo-
sium, which argues that “[t]he original justifications for [Title II] have become 
weaker” at the same time that “the scope of the law has become ever more ex-
tensive,” is the perfect embodiment of the threat I describe.23 
My argument proceeds as follows. In Part I of this Essay, I discuss the con-
troversy in the Reconstruction and civil rights eras over the penetration of anti-
discrimination principles into the realm of private businesses’ choice of cus-
tomers. Although the controversy was discussed in the earlier era in terms of 
civil versus social rights, and in the later era in terms of property, contract, and 
 
  18. See 3 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 209-17 
(2014). 
  19. See infra Part II.A. 
  20. See infra Part II. 
  21. 530 U.S. 640 (2000). 
  22. See infra Part II.C. 
  23. Richard A. Epstein, Public Accommodations Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964: 
Why Freedom of Association Counts as a Human Right, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1261 
(2014).  
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association, I argue that the same fundamental concerns motivated objections to 
public accommodations laws in both periods. In Part II, I turn to the current 
controversy. I begin by discussing the response to Rand Paul’s 2010 comments 
and showing that Paul’s libertarian opponents disagreed with him only on 
pragmatic—not principled—grounds. I then turn to an analysis of Dale and of 
the recent developments that promise to undermine the expressive-commercial 
distinction that has kept Dale from threatening the core of public accommoda-
tions law.  
My main goal in this Essay is analytic and descriptive. I aim to show that 
although we no longer use the language of civil and social rights, the law of 
public accommodations discrimination remains preoccupied by the same sorts 
of questions that it once confronted using that language. Today’s controversy 
regarding public accommodations laws is a controversy about whether the civil 
rights category should cede back some of the territory it once conquered from 
the category of social rights. Although I have my own normative views about 
that controversy, I hope that my analytic account is one on which participants 
on both sides of the debate can agree. 
I. THE EXPANDING TERRITORY OF “CIVIL RIGHTS,” FROM 
RECONSTRUCTION THROUGH THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA 
From the moment the American civil rights project began, tension and con-
flict have existed regarding how broadly and deeply equality principles should 
extend into civil, economic, and social relations. During Reconstruction, these 
tensions and conflicts were expressed through the language of the tripartite the-
ory of civil, political, and social rights. By the civil rights era of the mid-
twentieth century, the language of the tripartite theory had largely dropped out 
of the mainstream discourse. But the same substantive tensions and conflicts 
continued. As the civil rights era proceeded, political and judicial actors ex-
panded the domain of the equality principle more and more broadly. In so do-
ing, Congress and the courts repeatedly overrode objections that the expanding 
civil rights laws intruded too deeply into private decisions—objections that 
would, a century earlier, have been framed in terms of the civil-rights/social-
rights distinction. Although Congress and the courts overrode those objections, 
the objections never disappeared. Rather, the degree to which civil rights laws 
could properly intrude into the formerly “private” or “social” sphere remained 
contested from Reconstruction through the end of the civil rights era. 
In this Part, I introduce the conflict over the breadth of the civil rights pro-
ject in the Reconstruction and civil rights eras. My aim is not to tell anything 
close to the entire history of this conflict. Instead, I aim to show that, in both 
periods, influential skeptics objected that the project of racial equality was im-
properly intruding on what should be understood as private choices; and to 
show that those objections, although expressed in the language of social rights 
during Reconstruction and of property, contract, and free association during the 
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civil rights era, were substantively similar. My discussion in this Part thus pro-
vides important background for Part II of this Essay, which shows how the 
same conflict continues today. 
During Reconstruction, the conflicts over the scope of civil rights laws 
were often expressed in the language of the tripartite theory of rights. Most 
public actors at the time seem to have taken for granted that there was a distinc-
tion between three classes of rights: civil rights (understood as basic rights at-
tendant to participation in civil society), political rights (understood as rights to 
participate in the governance of the community), and social rights (understood 
as rights involving the participation in social life).24 The boundaries between 
these different spheres of rights were highly contested, and there was no con-
sensus on precisely what each sphere included. But there was a relatively clear 
consensus about the “core of each conception”: “The core civil rights included 
the rights to sue and testify; social rights included the right to select one’s asso-
ciates; voting was the central political right.”25  
As a number of scholars have demonstrated, Reconstruction-era congres-
sional debates acknowledged that civil, political, and social rights represented 
three distinct dimensions of equality.26 Instead of challenging the tripartite the-
ory, those debates concerned whether particular areas of life should be under-
stood as implicating civil rights or instead social or political rights. In the 
standard account of those debates, most participants agreed that the Thirteenth 
and Fourteenth Amendments (and the Civil Rights Act of 1866) focused on 
protecting civil rights, the Fifteenth Amendment (and its enforcing legislation) 
protected political rights, and no provision of federal law protected equality in 
social rights.27 Throughout this period, the scope of the civil rights category 
 
  24. Richard Primus argues, with considerable force, that Republicans before and after 
the Civil War developed and relied on this tripartite theory to justify the “selective extension 
of rights to blacks”—“guaranteeing blacks the rights necessary to a free labor system, such 
as rights of contract, property, movement, and access to courts of law” without “grant[ing] 
blacks rights to vote and hold office.” RICHARD A. PRIMUS, THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE OF 
RIGHTS 154 (1999). 
  25. Mark Tushnet, The Politics of Equality in Constitutional Law: The Equal Protec-
tion Clause, Dr. Du Bois, and Charles Hamilton Houston, 74 J. AM. HIST. 884, 886 (1987); 
see also Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of 
Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1120 (1997) (“Distinctions among 
civil, political, and social rights functioned more as a framework for debate than a conceptu-
al scheme of any legal precision. But it was generally understood that civil rights were those 
rights exercised by economic man, such as the capacity to hold property and enter into con-
tracts, and to bring suit to defend those rights in the legal system. Voting was the core politi-
cal right. Social rights were those forms of association that, white Americans feared, would 
obliterate status distinctions and result in the ‘amalgamation’ of the races.” (footnotes omit-
ted)). 
  26. See, e.g., JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 220-28 (2011). 
  27. See, e.g., id. Primus argues instead that the Reconstruction-era Republicans actual-
ly saw all three Amendments as protecting civil rights and that the Fifteenth Amendment 
reflects the expansion of the concept of civil rights rather than the extension of constitutional 
protection to political rights. See PRIMUS, supra note 24, at 156-60. 
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remained highly contested, and social rights—almost an epithet28—represented 
a residual category of activities that the law did not reach. Perhaps the broadest 
congressional understanding of the civil rights category during the Reconstruc-
tion era appears in the Civil Rights Act of 1875, which treated race discrimina-
tion in public accommodations as a violation of civil, rather than merely social, 
rights.29 
In its decisions that punctuated the end of Reconstruction, the Supreme 
Court rejected the Forty-Third Congress’s broad understanding of the civil 
rights category. Insisting that the Reconstruction Amendments did not regu-
late—and did not authorize Congress to regulate—practices that implicated on-
ly social rights, the Court read the civil rights category narrowly and the social 
rights category broadly. In the Civil Rights Cases, the Court struck down the 
Civil Rights Act of 1875 and specifically described the rights enforced by the 
statute—rights to nondiscrimination in public accommodations—as “social 
rights.”30 Justice Harlan’s dissent accepted the civil-rights/social-rights distinc-
tion, though he argued forcefully that the rights enforced by the statute were not 
social rights but civil rights.31 And in Plessy v. Ferguson,32 the Court upheld a 
state law that required the segregation of accommodations on railroad cars 
against a Fourteenth Amendment challenge. The Court explained that the Four-
teenth Amendment “could not have been intended” to “enforce social . . . 
equality.”33 It elaborated: “If the civil and political rights of both races be equal 
one cannot be inferior to the other civilly or politically. If one race be inferior 
to the other socially, the Constitution of the United States cannot put them upon 
the same plane.”34 Again, Justice Harlan’s dissent agreed that the Fourteenth 
Amendment did not reach inequalities in social rights.35 His disagreement with 
 
  28. See Rebecca J. Scott, Public Rights, Social Equality, and the Conceptual Roots of 
the Plessy Challenge, 106 MICH. L. REV. 777, 781 (2008) (“To conflate the phrase ‘social 
equality’ with an imagined taxonomy of civil, political, and social rights is to mistake an in-
sult for an analytic exercise.”). 
  29. See ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335, 335-36, invalidated by The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 
3 (1883); see also ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 
1863-1877, at 556 (1988) (describing the Civil Rights Act of 1875 as “an unprecedented ex-
ercise of national authority” that “breached traditional federalist principles more fully than 
any previous Reconstruction legislation”). For an illuminating treatment of the discussion of 
the civil rights and social rights categories in the legislative debates preceding enactment of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1875, see Patrick O. Gudridge, Privileges and Permissions: The Civil 
Rights Act of 1875, 8 LAW & PHIL. 83 (1989). 
  30. 109 U.S. at 22. 
  31. See id. at 59-60 (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also Siegel, supra note 25, at 1126-27 
(“Justice Harlan broke with the majority because he, like the Congress that enacted the 1875 
Civil Rights Act, viewed equal access to public transportation as a civil right which, accord-
ingly, could not be the subject of racially discriminatory regulation . . . .”). 
  32. 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
  33. Id. at 544. 
  34. Id. at 551-52. 
  35. See id. at 561 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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the Court rested on his conclusion that railroad segregation implicated civil, ra-
ther than social, equality.36 
The decisions in the Civil Rights Cases and Plessy highlight the consensus 
at the time that social equality was beyond the power of law to achieve. For 
many during the Reconstruction era, the civil-rights/social-rights distinction 
served a function like the one that the structurally similar public-private distinc-
tion would later be understood to serve—to preserve a sphere of private, indi-
vidual choice.37 “In essence,” argue Robert Post and Reva Siegel, “the Court 
used the distinction between civil and social rights to mark a sphere of associa-
tional freedom in which law would allow practices of race discrimination to 
flourish.”38 In the context of race relations specifically, a key aim of the civil-
rights/social-rights distinction was to ensure that “[w]hites could refuse to have 
social contacts with blacks and could exclude blacks from their homes.”39 As 
Jack Balkin puts it, Reconstruction-era figures believed that “[s]ocial equality 
and social inequality were not the business of the state; rather social equality 
and social inequality were natural features of human interaction produced 
through the preferences and behavior of private individuals, and normally the 
state should not interfere with these decisions.”40 
In Plessy and subsequent cases, however, the Court applied the social 
rights concept beyond cases in which it merely protected the private choice of 
the litigants before it. Rather, the Court applied the concept to uphold statutes 
that required race segregation in public conveyances and schools—statutes that 
might override the individual choices of private actors.41 And the social rights 
concept also played a key role in ensuring that prohibitions on interracial mar-
riage—which perforce override private choices—would not be held unconstitu-
tional.42  
 
  36. See id. at 562-63. 
  37. It is hardly surprising, for this reason, that the civil-rights/social-rights distinction 
proved to be unstable and continually contested. For examples of discussions of the similar 
instability of the public-private distinction, see Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline 
of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1349 (1982); and Paul Starr, The Mean-
ing of Privatization, 6 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 6 (1988). 
  38. Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Essay, Equal Protection by Law: Federal Anti-
discrimination Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441, 490 (2000). 
  39. Tushnet, supra note 25, at 887.  
  40. Jack M. Balkin, Plessy, Brown, and Grutter: A Play in Three Acts, 26 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1689, 1694 (2005). 
  41. See, e.g., Berea Coll. v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908) (upholding a law that pro-
hibited racial integration in private colleges). 
  42. See Balkin, supra note 40, at 1694-95 (“‘[S]ocial equality’ had another, more ra-
cially charged meaning. It was also a code word for miscegenation and racial intermar-
riage.”); Siegel, supra note 25, at 1123 (“Courts upholding antimiscegenation statutes relied 
upon the distinction between civil and social rights until they were confident enough—which 
they were not initially—simply to assert that regulating marriage lay beyond the scope of 
federal power.”); see also Scott, supra note 28, at 781 (“‘Social equality,’ by contrast, was a 
label the[] enemies [of Homer Plessy’s supporters] had long attempted to pin on the propo-
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There was an undeniable tension between these two instantiations of the 
concept of social equality,43 but the basic animating argument for distinguish-
ing between civil and social equality remained one of preserving private choice. 
In Balkin’s words, the dominant thinking at the time rested on the idea that 
“social equality and inequality are produced in the realm of private choice” and 
that the government could take account of widespread social understandings 
through “reasonable restrictions designed to soothe social tensions and diffuse 
social conflicts.”44 Such restrictions, rather than constituting “social engineer-
ing,” were understood by Plessy-era thinkers to “facilitate the private sphere.”45 
This embrace of regulation as a means to protect private choice was unstable—
as became increasingly obvious during the Lochner period—but that is some-
what beside my point. Rather, my point is simply that the civil-rights/social-
rights distinction served, by the end of Reconstruction, to protect race discrimi-
nation in public accommodations and that the justification offered for that  
distinction was one of protecting a “social” sphere of private choice in race  
relations. 
When the civil rights era began nearly a hundred years later, people no 
longer spoke in terms of civil rights versus social rights. Balkin suggests that 
the questions of the civil rights era no longer “fit well into the tripartite theo-
ry.”46 Speaking of Brown v. Board of Education specifically, he argues that 
“[i]t is hard to say whether education is a question of political, civil, or social 
equality.”47 That is of course true. But I doubt it is any more true for education 
than for many other areas of life. The scope of the civil rights and social rights 
categories has always been contested. There is good evidence that many Re-
construction-era Republicans believed that education was a matter of social, ra-
ther than civil, equality.48 As Balkin argues, those Reconstruction-era figures 
did not anticipate the development of “a pervasive welfare state.”49 He suggests 
that the New Deal revolution therefore rendered the tripartite theory obsolete.50 
One could, however, just as easily say that the rise of the American social wel-
fare state was an important development that should affect our understanding of 
what belongs in the civil and social rights categories but that should not invali-
 
nents of equal public rights in order to associate public rights with private intimacy and 
thereby to trigger the host of fears connected with the image of black men in physical prox-
imity to white women.”). 
  43. See Balkin, supra note 40, at 1695. 
  44. Id. at 1701. 
  45. Id. 
  46. See id. at 1709. 
  47. Id. 
  48. See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, The Plessy Era, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 303, 325 
(“Many northern Republicans in 1866 continued to resist the extension to blacks of either 
equal political rights, such as voting or jury service, or social rights, such as interracial mar-
riage or school integration.”). 
  49. Balkin, supra note 40, at 1709. 
  50. See id. at 1709-10. 
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date the efforts at categorization. In Great Britain, for example, T.H. Marshall 
argued in 1950 that the rise of the welfare state meant that access to education 
and social services should be considered an element of citizenship.51 One could 
readily envision the jurisprudence of the civil rights era in the United States as 
having followed a similar path of explicitly expanding the civil rights catego-
ry—and concomitantly contracting the social rights category. 
Much of Brown itself is consistent with an argument that education, while 
considered a matter of social equality in the Reconstruction era, had become, 
by the middle of the twentieth century, a matter of civil equality. Chief Justice 
Warren’s famous statement that “we cannot turn the clock back to 1868 when 
the [Fourteenth] Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896 when Plessy v. Fer-
guson was written,”52 referred specifically to the increasingly central contribu-
tion of public education to citizenship. The very next sentence in the Brown 
opinion makes this clear: “We must consider public education in the light of its 
full development and its present place in American life throughout the Na-
tion.”53 The Brown opinion notes that unlike in the middle to late nineteenth 
century, public education in 1954 was “perhaps the most important function of 
state and local governments,” something recognized as central to participation 
in “our democratic society.”54 And the Court described its ultimate holding as 
follows: “We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine of ‘sep-
arate but equal’ has no place.”55 
On its face, Brown readily lends itself to the reading that the Court was 
leaving in place the tripartite theory but merely redrawing the line between civil 
and social rights, shifting education into the civil category. But that is not how 
Brown came to be understood. Instead, that decision came to be understood as 
embracing a generic principle of equality—though whether that principle is an 
antidiscrimination or an antisubordination principle remains very much the sub-
ject of debate.56 Still, although the language of the tripartite theory largely 
dropped out of the mainstream discourse, the substantive concerns that under-
lay that theory continued to play a major role in political and legal debates. The 
public accommodations context—which provided the setting for the Court to 
enforce a strong civil-rights/social-rights distinction in the Civil Rights Cases 
and Plessy—continued to provide a key setting in which the underlying con-
cerns would be expressed in the 1960s and later. This is evident in the objec-
tions expressed by opponents of Title II of the Civil Rights Act. Although these 
opponents couched their objections in more straightforward libertarian terms 
 
  51. See T.H. MARSHALL, CITIZENSHIP AND SOCIAL CLASS 10-11, 46-48 (1950). 
  52. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 492 (1954). 
  53. Id. at 492-93 (emphasis added). 
  54. Id. at 493. 
  55. Id. at 495 (emphasis added). 
  56. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification 
Values in Constitutional Struggles over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1532-46 (2004). 
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than did the nineteenth-century defenders of the civil-rights/social-rights  
distinction, their concerns were fundamentally the same. 
Opponents of Title II sometimes framed their arguments in terms of free-
dom of contract or association. Robert Bork’s famous critique of the Civil 
Rights Act took this form.57 Notwithstanding that framing, Bork’s argument 
sounded themes quite resonant with the nineteenth-century defense of a pro-
tected sphere of social rights—though with the line between civil and social 
rights substantially shifted. Where the Court of the late nineteenth century 
thought it an appropriate role of the law to enforce social customs against inte-
gration in the social sphere as in Plessy, Bork acknowledged that it was appro-
priate to displace state “laws which prevent individuals, whether white or Ne-
gro, from dealing with those who are willing to deal with them.”58 But like the 
Court of the Civil Rights Cases, Bork argued that the law should not override 
private choices in favor of discrimination in the social sphere—that it should 
not “tell [individuals] they may not act on their racial preferences in particular 
areas of life.”59 Bork offered the same views privately to Senator Barry Gold-
water, who relied on them in opposing the Civil Rights Act.60  
As Kevin Kruse shows, opposition to civil rights laws during this period, 
though often framed in the libertarian terms of freedom of association, often 
precisely duplicated the Plessy-era conception of social rights, in which gov-
ernment intervention to enforce segregation in the social sphere was understood 
as permissible.61 Kruse demonstrates that “freedom of association” became a 
key rallying cry for opponents of both Title II of the Civil Rights Act and de-
segregation of public schools. Herbert Wechsler’s pained assessment of Brown, 
of course, similarly invoked freedom of association.62 
Other times, the arguments against Title II were framed in terms of the 
Thirteenth Amendment. The argument was not the one we might have expected 
from the Civil Rights Cases—that discrimination in public accommodations 
was not a badge and incident of slavery that Congress had Thirteenth Amend-
ment power to target.63 Instead, it was the rather stunning argument that pro-
hibiting businesses from discriminating on the basis of race conscripted the 
 
  57. See Bork, supra note 2, at 21-22. 
  58. Id. at 22. 
  59. Id. 
  60. See PERLSTEIN, supra note 3, at 363-64. 
  61. See KEVIN M. KRUSE, WHITE FLIGHT: ATLANTA AND THE MAKING OF MODERN 
CONSERVATISM 161-80 (2005); Kevin M. Kruse, The Fight for “Freedom of Association”: 
Segregationist Rights and Resistance in Atlanta, in MASSIVE RESISTANCE: SOUTHERN 
OPPOSITION TO THE SECOND RECONSTRUCTION 99, 100-01 (Clive Webb ed., 2005). 
  62. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 
HARV. L. REV. 1, 34 (1959). 
  63. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 24-25 (1883). 
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business owners into involuntary servitude.64 Strom Thurmond made this ar-
gument in his separate views attached to the Senate Report on the proposed 
Civil Rights Act.65 Senator Thurmond described the Thirteenth Amendment as 
“an insurmountable constitutional barrier” to Title II, because, by forcing busi-
nesses to serve customers their owners desired not to serve, the bill would im-
pose “involuntary servitude” on them.66 As Christopher Schmidt explains, “in 
the early 1960s, this unusual Thirteenth Amendment argument featured promi-
nently in the debate over the appropriate line between antidiscrimination policy 
and personal liberties.”67 Alfred Avins, a scholar whose work was widely cited 
by opponents of Title II, put the point this way in a prominent article: 
 The fact that Negroes, or those who sympathize with their aspirations, may 
believe that white persons who refuse to serve them are being arbitrary or ca-
pricious, does not alter in any way the legal effect of the thirteenth amend-
ment. This provision bans absolutely, and in the most express terms, the claim 
of any person to force any other person to serve him, for any reason whatso-
ever.68 
Avins, in turn, relied on Washington Supreme Court Justice Joseph 
Mallery’s dissent in the 1959 case of Browning v. Slenderella Systems.69 The 
Browning majority upheld the award of damages under the state’s public ac-
commodations law to an African American woman who had been refused ser-
vice at a weight loss clinic because of her race.70 Dissenting, Justice Mallery 
argued that the law violated the Thirteenth Amendment. In a much-quoted line, 
Mallery asserted that “[w]hen a white woman is compelled against her will to 
give a Negress a Swedish massage, that too is involuntary servitude.”71 Earlier 
in his opinion, Justice Mallery described the basis for his position in terms that 
align very closely with the nineteenth-century civil-rights/social-rights distinc-
tion: 
The few [businesses] that do not serve Negroes adopt that policy either be-
cause their clientele insist upon exclusiveness, or because of the reluctance of 
employees to render intimate personal service to Negroes. Both the clientele 
 
  64. For an excellent and extensive discussion of these arguments, see McClain, supra 
note 5, at 136-41. See also George Rutherglen, The Thirteenth Amendment, the Power of 
Congress, and the Shifting Sources of Civil Rights Law, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1551, 1561 
(2012) (“Paradoxically, it was the opponents of the Act, not its supporters, who relied upon 
the Thirteenth Amendment.”). 
  65. See S. REP. NO. 88-872, at 42-53 (1964) (individual views of Sen. Strom Thur-
mond). 
  66. Id. at 53 (emphasis omitted). 
  67. Schmidt, supra note 4, at 425. 
  68. Alfred Avins, Freedom of Choice in Personal Service Occupations: Thirteenth 
Amendment Limitations on Antidiscrimination Legislation, 49 CORNELL L.Q. 228, 254-55 
(1964). 
  69. 341 P.2d 859 (Wash. 1959) (en banc). 
  70. See id. at 861, 866. 
  71. Id. at 869 (Mallery, J., dissenting). 
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and the business operator have a constitutional right to discriminate in their 
private affairs upon any conceivable basis. The right to exclusiveness, like the 
right to privacy, is essential to freedom.72 
Whether framed as rights of contract, association, or freedom from invol-
untary servitude, these libertarian objections invoked the same notions of pre-
serving private choice that underlay the civil-rights/social-rights distinction. 
And, indeed, Avins himself specifically argued that Title II violated not only 
the Thirteenth Amendment but also what he characterized as the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s protection of free association—a protection he viewed as deriv-
ing from the Reconstruction-era refusal to “enact social equality.”73 Justice 
Mallery, too, made clear the connection between his Thirteenth Amendment 
position and the civil-rights/social-rights distinction, in a concurring opinion in 
the 1960 case of Price v. Evergreen Cemetery Co.74 The majority held that a 
state statute prohibiting race discrimination in burial services violated the 
Washington State Constitution’s single-subject rule.75 But Justice Mallery add-
ed a concurrence to note what he thought was the broader significance of the 
case in “reveal[ing] an ultimate aspiration of the Negro race”:  
This case demonstrates that the Negro desegregation program is not limited to 
public affairs. The right of white people to enjoy a choice of associates in their 
private lives is marked for extinction by the N.A.A.C.P. Compulsory total  
togetherness of Negroes and whites is to be achieved by judicial decrees in a 
series of Negro court actions.76  
This passage, with its overtones of interracial marriage, resonates strongly with 
the Plessy-era civil-rights/social-rights distinction. 
Congress, of course, rejected these arguments when it enacted Title II.77 
The Supreme Court also rejected them out of hand in the Heart of Atlanta 
case.78 Although we read Heart of Atlanta today for its congressional-power 
holding, the Court also explicitly rejected a challenge to the statute based on 
property, contract, free-association, and involuntary-servitude principles.79 And 
over the next decade or so, the civil-rights/social-rights distinction seemed to 
collapse, with the civil rights category capturing nearly all of the territory that 
 
  72. Id. 
  73. Alfred Avins, Social Equality and the Fourteenth Amendment: The Original Un-
derstanding, 4 HOUS. L. REV. 640, 656 (1967). 
  74. 357 P.2d 702 (Wash. 1960) (en banc). 
  75. See id. at 703. 
  76. Id. (Mallery, J., concurring); see also id. at 704 (“The Negro race, ably led by 
N.A.A.C.P., makes the result of every Negro lawsuit the measure of its success in securing 
not only rights equal to whites in public affairs, but also of special privileges for Negroes in 
private affairs.”). 
  77. See, e.g., McClain, supra note 5, at 128-35 (discussing the Senate report to the 
Civil Rights Act). 
  78. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964). 
  79. Id. at 258-61. 
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had formerly been occupied by social rights.80 In the 1967 Loving case, the 
Court ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited state laws barring inter-
racial marriage.81 During the Reconstruction era, marriage had of course been 
thought to fall within the domain of social equality, to which the Fourteenth 
Amendment did not extend.82 In 1968, Congress extended civil rights law to 
prohibit discrimination in the choice of a buyer to whom to sell (or a lessee to 
whom to rent) a house.83 The Court upheld that extension two months later by 
ruling that Congress could rationally believe that private housing discrimina-
tion was a badge and incident of slavery.84 When the Court extended that prec-
edent to race discrimination in private decisions to enter into contracts—in the 
specific context of private schools, but in a decision that seemed to apply to any 
contractual setting—it seemed that the triumph of civil rights over social rights 
was complete.85 Though some voices continued to sound social rights 
themes,86 they were largely drowned out by the overarching expansion of the 
civil rights sphere. 
This history might lead us to conclude that the civil-rights/social-rights  
distinction no longer matters in the law. As I hope to show in the rest of this 
Essay, I think that conclusion would be a mistake. There have always been con-
flicts regarding the proper boundary between antidiscrimination protections and 
 
  80. At the same time, the civil rights category was occupying the territory formerly 
occupied by political rights, as Congress and the courts increasingly characterized voting as 
a civil right protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elec-
tions, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966). See generally Bruce Ackerman & Jennifer Nou, Canonizing 
the Civil Rights Revolution: The People and the Poll Tax, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 63 (2009) 
(discussing these developments). For Justice Harlan’s effort to close the barn door on these 
developments, see Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 152 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). 
  81. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2 (1967). 
  82. See supra text accompanying note 42. 
  83. See Fair Housing Act of 1968, Pub. L. 90-284, tit. VIII, § 804, 82 Stat. 81, 83 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2012)). 
  84. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 412-13, 440-41 (1968). Jones did 
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at the time understood that point. See 3 ACKERMAN, supra note 18, at 415-16. 
  85. See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 179 (1976). 
  86. See id. at 189 (Powell, J., concurring) (arguing that the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 
“as interpreted by our prior decisions, does reach certain acts of racial discrimination that are 
‘private’ in the sense that they involve no state action,” but concluding that “choices, includ-
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private choices—the conflicts that the civil-rights/social-rights distinction once 
mediated. The Court and Congress of the civil rights era drew this boundary in 
a different place than did the Court of the Plessy era. But it did not eliminate 
the boundary. And it most especially did not end the contest over where the 
boundary should lie. As I argue in the next Part, we have seen increasing con-
flicts over the past decade and a half over the proper scope of public accommo-
dations law. These conflicts implicate the same tensions between public re-
sponsibility and private choice that informed the civil-rights/social-rights 
distinction. 
II. THE CONTEST TODAY 
The proper reach of civil rights laws regulating private business conduct is 
contested today to a degree that it has not been since the 1960s. Indeed, we are 
edging closer to reengaging precisely the same fights that occurred in the years 
surrounding the passage of Title II of the Civil Rights Act. This contest is a bit 
hidden, as even libertarian conservatives profess allegiance to Title II these 
days. But a close analysis of their arguments suggests that the position of these 
libertarians and conservatives is largely a tactical one—an effort to retreat to 
stronger political ground on which to fight the continued extensions of (and 
perhaps to commence a rollback of) the laws that prohibit discrimination by 
private parties.87 Although many libertarians have formally given up the effort 
to eliminate prohibitions on race discrimination by private places of public ac-
commodation, many have continued to oppose extensions of public accommo-
dations laws to new defendants and bases of discrimination. And their opposi-
tion to those extensions has been based on principles that, taken seriously, 
threaten the core of Title II. 
My argument in this Part unfolds in three stages. First, I examine a recent 
occasion in which libertarian opposition to public accommodations laws re-
ceived prominent airing in mainstream American politics: Rand Paul’s state-
ments questioning Title II during his 2010 Senate campaign. I argue that Paul’s 
statements, the reaction among prominent libertarians to those statements, and 
Paul’s subsequent backing away from them are telling of the continued contro-
versy over the penetration of antidiscrimination norms into spheres once 
thought “private.” Paul’s statements sounded the same civil-rights/social-rights 
themes that could be heard in the Supreme Court’s decision in the Civil Rights 
Cases—and especially in the opposition of Bork and Senator Goldwater to the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964. The reaction of prominent libertarians and Paul’s 
own retreat highlighted the degree to which a frontal assault remains politically 
 
  87. I should emphasize that an agenda to roll back the coverage of laws prohibiting 
private-sector discrimination is not the same as an agenda to promote private-sector discrim-
ination. One can honestly and vehemently oppose discrimination by private actors while still 
believing, on libertarian principle, that the government should not intervene to prevent it—
and many libertarians take this precise position. 
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untenable. But they also demonstrated the degree to which the same prominent 
libertarians remain committed to a civil-rights/social-rights distinction that is in 
deep tension with any modern-day law prohibiting discrimination by private 
businesses. 
The second stage of my argument examines one of the key positions to 
which libertarians retreated when they gave up their frontal attack on Title II: a 
distinction between “commercial” and “expressive” enterprises. Prominent lib-
ertarian commentators, notably Dale Carpenter,88 have argued that this distinc-
tion makes the most sense of the Supreme Court’s decision in Boy Scouts of 
America v. Dale. Dale held that the First Amendment right of free association 
entitled the Boy Scouts of America to an exemption from a state public ac-
commodations law that prohibited discrimination based on sexual orientation.89 
Commentators have read Dale broadly to shield nonprofit “expressive associa-
tions” from the application of public accommodations antidiscrimination laws. 
But they have typically assured skeptics that Dale poses no threat to the appli-
cation of public accommodations laws to for-profit businesses. The commer-
cial-expressive distinction is unstable, however. The same libertarian argu-
ments that justify shielding “expressive” organizations from antidiscrimination 
laws would also readily justify shielding for-profit businesses from those laws. 
These arguments thus threaten to reinstitute a form of the civil-rights/social-
rights distinction, with the line drawn in almost exactly the same place Robert 
Bork would have drawn it in the 1960s. 
In the final stage of my argument, I show that the threat is not just a theo-
retical one. Rather, a current wave of litigation pursuing the expressive and re-
ligious rights of for-profit corporations—through challenges to the application 
of public accommodations laws as well as challenges to the Affordable Care 
Act’s “contraception mandate”—relies on a theory that would collapse the ex-
pressive-commercial distinction. Although these challenges have had mixed 
success, they highlight the difficulty of cabining libertarian attacks on public 
accommodations laws to the marginal cases. Whether or not one thinks that 
these challenges should succeed, they demonstrate that we continue to struggle 
over the proper placement of the civil-rights/social-rights line, nearly fifty years 
after Congress and the Supreme Court supposedly laid that distinction to rest. 
A. Rand Paul and the Political Untenability of a Frontal Attack on Public 
Accommodations Laws 
It is unusual these days to hear arguments against public accommodations 
laws based on property rights and freedom of contract. After all, as a doctrinal 
matter, the Supreme Court’s Heart of Atlanta decision resolved the property-
 
  88. See Dale Carpenter, Expressive Association and Anti-Discrimination Law After 
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and-contract challenge to Title II of the Civil Rights Act.90 More recently, 
courts have rejected similar challenges to other laws prohibiting discrimination 
in public accommodations.91 Occasionally, however, a property-and-contract 
argument against laws prohibiting discrimination in public accommodations 
breaks through to prominence. And the result is revealing—about the continu-
ing contest over the line between civil rights and social rights and about differ-
ent political factions’ views of their strongest ground in that contest. 
The controversy over Rand Paul’s discussion of the Civil Rights Act in his 
2010 campaign offers a prominent recent example of this dynamic. The contro-
versy “started when the Louisville Courier-Journal placed on its Web site an 
April 17, 2010, interview between Paul and the paper’s editorial board.”92 
When asked if he would have supported the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Paul said 
that he supported the parts of the law that prohibited discrimination by state ac-
tors.93 But he suggested that he did not support the law’s prohibition on dis-
crimination by private businesses, because, he said, “I do believe in private 
ownership.”94 Paul said that he found racism “abhorrent” and “a bad business 
decision,” but, in language very similar to Bork’s forty-seven years earlier, he 
suggested that allowing a business owner to discriminate was “the hard part 
about believing in freedom.”95 In an appearance on the Rachel Maddow Show 
a month after his Courier-Journal interview, Paul made clear that his skepti-
cism of laws prohibiting discrimination by private businesses rested on a theory 
that the institution of private property required that a business be free from reg-
ulations limiting its choice of what customers to serve.96 He analogized Title II 
to a decision “that restaurants are publicly owned and not privately owned” and 
asked, rhetorically, “Does the owner of the restaurant own his restaurant? Or 
does the government own his restaurant?”97 Paul’s comments on this point 
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called to mind those of his father, Representative Ron Paul, when Representa-
tive Paul cast the lone vote against a resolution of the House of Representatives 
honoring the fortieth anniversary of the Civil Rights Act in 2004.98 
Substantively, Rand Paul’s argument rests on an understanding of property 
that fails to take account of the lessons of legal realism. In a postrealist world, 
we understand that regulation is not incompatible with private ownership. Laws 
delimiting the rights and obligations of property owners and those with whom 
they deal do not, in Paul’s phrasing, make the government the owner of the 
property. Indeed, the institutions of property and contract depend on back-
ground legal rules delimiting those rights and obligations and enforcing them in 
cases of breach. These rules may block certain transactions in which willing 
property owners wish to engage (such as by prohibiting the sale of landlocked 
parcels), but doing so may serve broader interests in democracy, freedom, and 
the operation of a system in which individuals have an opportunity to acquire 
and exchange property.99 As Morris Cohen put it almost a century ago, “[t]o be 
really effective,” property rights “must be supported by restrictions or positive 
duties on the part of owners, enforced by the state as much as the right to ex-
clude others.”100 “Ownership” cannot plausibly be defined as a state of nature 
in which the “owner” has complete authority to do whatever she wants with her 
property. If that is the definition, then nobody “owns” anything. We may agree 
or disagree about whether a particular restriction on an owner’s use of property 
is appropriate.101 But Paul was wrong to describe regulation that limits a busi-
ness’s choice of customers as rendering the proprietor no longer an “owner.”102 
Unlike his father, Rand Paul later sought to clarify that, despite his con-
cerns with Title II, he would have voted for the Civil Rights Act of 1964 be-
 
 98. See McClain, supra note 5, at 144-47; see also Kessler, supra note 92. 
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cause he supported the portions of the statute that prohibited discrimination by 
state actors.103 But his ultimate position on the Civil Rights Act is not what in-
terests me here. Rather, what interests me is the reaction that his comments 
drew from libertarian scholars and commentators in 2010. Although some lib-
ertarian commentators supported Paul’s suggestion that Title II violated basic 
liberties of property and contract,104 the most prominent of them embraced Ti-
tle II. Law professors Richard Epstein and David Bernstein, and the Cato Insti-
tute’s Jason Kuznicki, all argued that Paul had gotten it wrong.105 Moreover, all 
seemed to regard Paul’s comments as a bit of an embarrassment. Epstein noted 
ruefully that “[a]s Rand Paul captures the Republican senatorial nomination in 
Kentucky, libertarian theory takes its lumps in the popular press,” and he criti-
cized Paul’s answer to Maddow as reflecting “a rote application of the [Ayn] 
Randian approach.”106 Bernstein bemoaned “[t]he progressive libel of libertari-
ans as racial troglodytes for their consistent defense of private-sector autono-
my” and argued that “from both a moral and tactical perspective, opposition to 
[‘basic private sector antidiscrimination legislation’] should be rather low on 
the libertarian priority list.”107 And Kuznicki, after arguing that Title II was 
consistent with libertarian principles but might not be constitutional on an 
originalist account, observed that “it is bizarre and embarrassing to me that this 
should be the hill that anyone wants to die on in the name of originalism.”108 
The substance of Epstein’s, Bernstein’s, and Kuznicki’s arguments against 
Paul’s position, I contend, reflected what these writers understood to be their 
political dilemma. Each of these writers sought to articulate a theory that rec-
onciled Title II with libertarian principles while providing a principled, libertar-
ian basis for opposing expansion of public accommodations laws beyond race-
based protections covering a narrow class of businesses. But the balance is too 
precarious; the arguments offered by these writers either fail to reconcile Title 
II with libertarian principles or fail to provide a principled basis for opposing 
expansion of public accommodations laws beyond Title II. One suspects, there-
fore, that the driving force behind the articulation of these arguments is not 
principled so much as it is political. On a deeper level, one doubts that Epstein, 
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Bernstein, and Kuznicki really accept that Title II is consistent with libertarian 
principles. But they hope to avoid the “embarrass[ment]” that opposition to a 
deeply entrenched, widely accepted law would cause, so they are willing—as a 
“tactical” move—to concede that “hill” to the civil rights revolution while re-
treating to stronger political ground to fight off further advances of the public 
accommodations antidiscrimination project.109 
Bernstein’s intervention in the intralibertarian debate over Paul’s com-
ments exemplifies the problem. Bernstein notes approvingly that “libertarians 
are loath to concede the principle that the government may ban private sector 
discrimination,” because “the concept of antidiscrimination is almost infinitely 
malleable.”110 He observes that defenders of antidiscrimination laws “typically 
focus on laws banning racial discrimination” and says that “[t]hey do so be-
cause opposition to race discrimination has great historical and emotional reso-
nance.”111 But he notes that antidiscrimination laws extend far more broadly, 
“to discrimination based on religion, sex, age, disability (including one’s status 
as a recovering drug or alcohol addict), pregnancy, marital status, [or] veteran 
status,” and even to “everything from sexual orientation to political ideology to 
weight to appearance to membership in a motorcycle gang.”112 Thus, he con-
cludes, “to concede the general power of government to redress private dis-
crimination through legislation would be to concede virtually unlimited power 
to the government.”113 
So why does Bernstein defend Title II? Well, he argues, libertarians “are 
often willing to make certain exceptions to their opposition to anti-
discrimination laws, so long as they can identify an appropriate limiting princi-
ple.”114 And what is the limiting principle that should allow libertarians to 
make an exception to Title II? Bernstein makes two essential points. First, he 
argues, race discrimination in private business at the time Congress enacted the 
Civil Rights Act was not really private discrimination, because “the common 
law rule barred discrimination in places of public accommodation,” but courts 
after the Civil War “manipulated, changed, or ignored their preexisting com-
mon law to deprive African Americans the benefit of that rule.”115 Second, race 
discrimination at the time “wasn’t entirely a voluntary choice of business own-
ers,” because those who did not discriminate faced “the implicit threat of pri-
 
109. I am not the only one who reads the situation this way. Other libertarians accused 
these commentators in real time of pulling their punches for political reasons. See, e.g., Jef-
frey Miron, What Matters Are Consequences, Not Context, CATO UNBOUND (June 23, 2010), 
http://www.cato-unbound.org/2010/06/23/jeffrey-miron/what-matters-are-consequences-not-
context (responding directly to Bernstein). 
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vate violence and extra-legal harassment”—harassment “often undertaken with 
the approval of local officials.”116 This second argument is consistent with the 
position Epstein takes in Forbidden Grounds, in which he argues that Title II 
was necessary to overcome local “political forces” and “gangs bent on vio-
lence” against businesses in the South that would serve black and white cus-
tomers as equals.117 Not surprisingly, Epstein’s objection to Paul’s statement 
relies heavily on this point,118 as does Kuznicki’s.119 
These, however, are not strong arguments of libertarian principle for ac-
cepting Title II while rejecting broader extensions of public accommodations 
laws. The first—state action—point is initially appealing, but it extends far be-
yond Title II. As Joseph Singer has shown extensively, the common law doc-
trine before the Civil War in many jurisdictions at least plausibly prohibited 
any discrimination by any business holding itself out as serving the public. The 
prohibition on the right to refuse service does not appear to have been limited 
to cases in which the refusal was based on race, and there is evidence that the 
prohibition was not limited to the narrow class of “public accommodations” 
later covered by Title II of the Civil Rights Act.120 So the common law history 
might in fact justify a wide array of antidiscrimination protections, as applied to 
a wide array of businesses. More important, Bernstein’s acceptance of the base-
line common law rule means that he can have no principled objection to the 
government imposing antidiscrimination laws on private businesses. If the gov-
ernment may impose such a rule through the actions of courts, there is no liber-
tarian reason why it may not impose such a rule through legislation. (To return 
to Paul’s articulation of the point, Bernstein never explains why a statutory 
prohibition on discrimination would make the government the “owner” of the 
business, while a judicially imposed prohibition would leave “ownership” in 
private hands.) 
As for the second point, that discrimination in the South was enforced by 
private violence and harassment in which local officials sometimes acquiesced, 
the essential problem is that Title II extends far beyond cases in which private-
sector discrimination is supported by “a white supremacist cartel.”121 Bernstein 
tacitly admits that such a cartel did not generally exist in the North,122 yet Title 
II applies there as well. And Title II continues to apply today even after the fla-
grant public and private discriminatory system of Jim Crow has been eliminat-
ed.123 Indeed, it is notable that when Epstein made a version of the white-
 
116. Id. 
117. EPSTEIN, supra note 7, at 127-28. 
118. See Epstein, supra note 105. 
119. See Kuznicki, supra note 105. 
120. See Singer, supra note 9, at 1303-31. 
121. Bernstein, supra note 105. 
122. See id. 
123. See, e.g., Jacoby, supra note 104 (“What is the justification for laws banning pri-
vate discrimination today, when Jim Crow is dead, racism is overwhelmingly abominated, 
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supremacist-cartel argument in Forbidden Grounds, he said only that “[i]n the 
Old South Title II was needed” to overcome a “coordination problem” caused 
“by the selective use of private force to interfere with ordinary common law 
rights of trade.”124 In his response to Paul, Epstein again argued that Title II 
was necessary at the time it was enacted, but he argued against current repeal 
only on the narrower pragmatic ground that today the statute basically does 
nothing: it “has been moribund for years,” and its “practical inconvenience is 
zero,” though its “symbolic importance is enormous.”125  
Although Epstein resists a repeal of Title II, the enactment of such a law 
today, in the absence of a regime like Jim Crow, would contravene his libertar-
ian principles. This is clear from his discussion in Forbidden Grounds itself, 
which rests its support for Title II on white-supremacist-cartel grounds. It is 
even clearer from Epstein’s subsequent article analyzing Boy Scouts of America 
v. Dale—a case I discuss extensively in the next Subpart.126 In that article, Ep-
stein is explicit that “the state has no interest in counteracting discrimination by 
private associations”—commercial or noncommercial—“that do not possess 
monopoly power.”127 In his contribution to this Symposium, Epstein not only 
elaborates the monopoly-power position he articulated in his Dale piece but al-
so argues that the monopoly power of traditional public accommodations has 
eroded substantially in the last fifty years.128 
As Epstein himself acknowledges in his contribution to this Symposium,129 
the white-supremacist-cartel justification would not easily support Title II to-
day. Even as of 1964, if the problem was a cartel that enforced discrimination 
by businesses via threats, violence, and harassment, why is the proper libertari-
an response not to directly target the threats, violence, harassment, and monop-
 
and a black man is president of the United States?”). None of this is to say that the effects of 
Jim Crow are entirely in the past or that intentional race discrimination is in the past at all. 
For good recent discussions of the continuing significance of race in America, see generally 
DARIA ROITHMAYR, REPRODUCING RACISM: HOW EVERYDAY CHOICES LOCK IN WHITE 
ADVANTAGE (2014) (analogizing persistent racial inequality in the United States to a cartel); 
THOMAS J. SUGRUE, NOT EVEN PAST: BARACK OBAMA AND THE BURDEN OF RACE (2010) 
(discussing persistent racial divisions in America); and Mario L. Barnes et al., A Post-Race 
Equal Protection?, 98 GEO. L.J. 967 (2010) (arguing that “the promise of post-racialism is 
still premature” (capitalization altered)). But I doubt that Bernstein, Epstein, and other liber-
tarians would find persistent racial inequality to be the sort of pervasive “white supremacist 
cartel” that they believe is necessary to justify Title II. 
124. EPSTEIN, supra note 7, at 128 (emphasis added). 
125. Epstein, supra note 105. Epstein takes a similar position in his contribution to this 
Symposium. See Epstein, supra note 23, at 1264. 
126. See Richard A. Epstein, The Constitutional Perils of Moderation: The Case of the 
Boy Scouts, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 119, 138-39 (2000). 
127. Id. at 120. 
128. See Epstein, supra note 23, at 1261. 
129. See id. at 1260-61. 
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oly, so that business owners will be truly free to choose whom to serve?130 
Bernstein says that targeting the cartel directly would have required “a massive 
federal takeover of local government to prevent violence and threats against, 
and extralegal harassment of, those who chose to integrate,” and that Title II’s 
ban on discrimination by private business owners was a much more 
“[p]ractical” way of achieving the same end.131 But that makes no sense. If 
those who engaged in threats, violence, and harassment to prevent business 
owners from serving blacks could not be stopped by the threat of federal prose-
cution—at least without a “massive federal takeover of local government”—
then why would they be stopped by a federal law prohibiting business owners 
from discriminating? Bernstein says that Title II allowed business owners to 
meet “threats of violence and harassment” with “an appeal to the [business’s] 
obligation to obey federal law.”132 But it is not clear why a Ku Klux Klan 
member who was not deterred by the threat that he would be personally subject 
to criminal prosecution for violent threats against businesses would be deterred 
by the fear that the victim of those threats would be subject to injunctive relief 
and civil penalties for giving into them. And Bernstein never explains why en-
forcing Title II in this context would not have required the same sort of “mas-
sive federal takeover” that he believes it would have taken to enforce the prohi-
bition on threats, violence, and harassment.  
The effort by Bernstein, Epstein, and others to construct a limiting princi-
ple that allows libertarians to support Title II while opposing the extension of 
prohibitions on public accommodations discrimination thus should be regarded 
as a failure on its own terms. The argument either does not provide a principled 
libertarian justification for Title II or does not provide a basis for limiting the 
extension of public accommodations laws. The libertarian objections to Paul’s 
comments thus are best regarded as reflecting a keen sense of the politically 
possible—a concession that our society durably regards a right to be free from 
race discrimination by certain core public accommodations as a civil right. But 
the position leaves open the opportunity to engage in further contest over where 
to draw the line between civil and social rights—a contest that will be waged 
on ground that is more politically favorable to skeptics of antidiscrimination 
laws.  
As I show in the rest of the Essay, that contest has indeed moved to more 
favorable ground for libertarians by focusing on circumstances in which anti-
discrimination laws seem to violate not just pre-legal-realist understandings of 
property ownership but also more modern understandings of civil liberties. I 
turn to these controversies in the next two Subparts of the Essay. As I note, 
though, whatever the doctrinal heading, the contest is the same one that has 
 
130. See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 7, at 29-30 (arguing for state intervention to prevent 
force and fraud). 
131. Bernstein, supra note 105. 
132. Id. 
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persisted since the Reconstruction-era distinction between civil rights and so-
cial rights came to prominence—a contest over defining the degree to which 
antidiscrimination law may penetrate into spaces once understood as “private” 
or “social.” And, indeed, many of the arguments for expanding or contracting 
the civil rights sphere are the same across the doctrinal contexts. All of this 
suggests that the doctrinal arguments are merely the latest vehicle for continu-
ing the long-running contest between broad and narrow understandings of civil 
rights. 
B. Dale and the Expressive-Commercial Distinction 
Beginning with its decision in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, the Supreme 
Court has offered libertarian opponents new ground from which to challenge 
and limit public accommodations laws. Dale held that, at least in some circum-
stances, an organization has a First Amendment right against the application of 
public accommodations laws. Dale itself is not a very clear opinion. Read at its 
broadest, it threatens all public accommodations laws. But many commentators 
have argued that no such threat exists.133 They have read Dale as resting im-
plicitly on an expressive-commercial distinction. In their reading, nonprofit 
“expressive” organizations have a constitutional defense to the application of 
public accommodations laws, but for-profit “commercial” ones do not. 
In this Subpart, I respond to these arguments on their own terms. On its 
face, Dale seems to threaten the constitutionality of applying public accommo-
dations laws in many circumstances beyond the specific context of the case. I 
then turn to the expressive-commercial distinction, which many commentators 
have relied on in suggesting the threat is limited. I argue that the distinction is a 
very unstable basis for confining the libertarian principles of Dale. 
Dale involved a state law prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination by 
public accommodations. The Court held that application of that law to bar the 
Boy Scouts from excluding an openly gay assistant scoutmaster from member-
ship violated its First Amendment rights of expressive association.134 The Boy 
Scouts stated that it taught that homosexuality was not “morally straight,” and 
that allowing an openly gay individual to serve as an assistant scoutmaster 
would impair that message.135 The Court agreed: “Dale’s presence in the Boy 
Scouts would, at the very least, force the organization to send a message, both 
to the youth members and the world, that the Boy Scouts accepts homosexual 
conduct as a legitimate form of behavior.”136 And it concluded that “[t]he state 
interests embodied in New Jersey’s public accommodations law do not justify 
such a severe intrusion on the Boy Scouts’ rights to freedom of expressive as-
 
133. See infra note 151 and accompanying text. 
134. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 644 (2000). 
135. See id. at 649-53. 
136. Id. at 653. 
 
June 2014] LIBERTARIANISM AND CIVIL RIGHTS 1229 
sociation.”137 The Court, however, did not elaborate on what sorts of state in-
terests would be sufficient to justify such an intrusion. 
The risk Dale poses to all public accommodations laws is evident. If the 
mere requirement that an organization not discriminate against gays in admis-
sion to membership is compelled association or forced speech that violates the 
organization’s First Amendment rights, the requirement that a business not dis-
criminate against African American customers could readily be understood as 
compelled association or forced speech by a parallel argument. A business cor-
poration, just like a nonprofit association, has First Amendment rights—
including rights against being compelled to support the messages of others in 
some circumstances—under current doctrine.138 Serving an African American 
customer in a restaurant side by side with white customers sends the message 
of equal citizenship of blacks and whites at least as strongly as admitting gay 
members to the Boy Scouts sends the message that homosexuality is accepta-
ble.139 Indeed, the compelled-message argument is plausibly stronger in the 
restaurant case than in the Boy Scouts case. When a restaurant gives equal ser-
vice to black and white customers, it necessarily sends the message that blacks 
and whites deserve equal service. The message has a direct nexus to the restau-
rant’s action. But when an organization admits an individual to membership, it 
does not necessarily send a message of endorsing everything the individual 
does outside of activities sponsored by the organization.140 
And, of course, freedom of association has long been a key argument of-
fered against public accommodations laws. Bork’s classic New Republic article 
 
137. Id. at 659. 
138. See, e.g., United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 410-11 (2001) (apply-
ing the First Amendment compelled-speech doctrine to invalidate a requirement that mush-
room producers “subsidize speech with which they disagree”); see also Citizens United v. 
FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 342-43 (2010) (holding that “political speech does not lose First 
Amendment protection ‘simply because its source is a corporation’” (quoting First Nat’l 
Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784 (1978))). 
139. See Andrew Koppelman, Signs of the Times: Dale v. Boy Scouts of America and 
the Changing Meaning of Nondiscrimination, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1819, 1822-23 (2002) 
(“Consider the following hypothetical: Ollie’s Barbecue is a restaurant notorious in some 
quarters for the time, some decades ago, when it litigated its right to exclude blacks, all the 
way to the Supreme Court. Suppose that tomorrow it decides that it expresses a message of 
white supremacy and segregation. It therefore claims a right to exclude blacks, since includ-
ing them would burden the expression of its viewpoint of white supremacy.” (footnote omit-
ted)). Ollie’s Barbecue, of course, was the business involved in Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 
U.S. 294 (1964), a companion case to Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 
241 (1964). On the same point, see Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment’s Purpose, 53 
STAN. L. REV. 767, 808 (2001) (“The truth, however, is that antidiscrimination laws do cen-
trally interfere with the ability of many people to communicate certain messages and val-
ues.”). 
140. See Hans Allhoff, Membership & Messages: The (Il)logic of Expressive Associa-
tion Doctrine, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1455, 1456 (2013) (“[I]t will almost always be the case 
that an unwanted member’s presence in an organization can mean any number of things be-
yond the organization’s approval of what he or she stands for.”). 
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objecting to the Civil Rights Act repeatedly invokes associational freedom ar-
guments.141 And, as we have seen, William Rehnquist, then a private attorney 
in Phoenix, joined Bork in advising Senator Barry Goldwater to vote against 
the bill.142 Rehnquist, as Chief Justice, authored the opinion of the Court in 
Dale. 
Given this background, it should be no surprise that the Dale dissenters 
charged the majority with “convert[ing] the right of expressive association into 
an easy trump of any antidiscrimination law.”143 And a number of commenta-
tors similarly saw Dale as a general threat to antidiscrimination and public ac-
commodations laws.144 As Andrew Koppelman and Tobias Wolff show, how-
ever, the threat has not (yet) come to pass; the lower courts have not read Dale 
as broadly as its logic might imply.145 
One key means by which lower courts have limited Dale is by erecting an 
expressive-commercial distinction. This distinction finds its origin in Justice 
O’Connor’s partial concurrence in Roberts v. United States Jaycees.146 Justice 
O’Connor said that “an association engaged exclusively in protected expression 
enjoys First Amendment protection of both the content of its message and the 
choice of its members,” while she found “only minimal constitutional protec-
tion of the freedom of commercial association.”147 She stated flatly that “[t]he 
Constitution does not guarantee a right to choose employees, customers, sup-
pliers, or those with whom one engages in simple commercial transactions, 
without restraint from the State.”148 In deciding whether an organization is ex-
pressive or commercial, she argued, a court should look to whether the organi-
zation “is predominantly engaged in protected expression”149: “An association 
must choose its market. Once it enters the marketplace of commerce in any 
substantial degree it loses the complete control over its membership that it 
would otherwise enjoy if it confined its affairs to the marketplace of ideas.”150 
 
141. See Bork, supra note 2. 
142. See PERLSTEIN, supra note 3, at 363-64. 
143. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 701-02 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting); 
see also id. at 695 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority’s rule implies “a limit-
less right to exclude for every organization”). 
144. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky & Catherine Fisk, The Expressive Interest of Associ-
ations, 9 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 595, 601 (2001) (stating that Dale “means that any group 
that wants to discriminate and exempt itself from state anti-bias laws can do so by claiming, 
during litigation, that it has a discriminatory purpose”); Rubenfeld, supra note 139, at 812. 
145. See ANDREW KOPPELMAN & TOBIAS BARRINGTON WOLFF, A RIGHT TO 
DISCRIMINATE? HOW THE CASE OF BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA V. JAMES DALE WARPED THE LAW 
OF FREE ASSOCIATION 48-52 (2009). 
146. 468 U.S. 609, 631 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). 
147. Id. at 633-34. 
148. Id. at 634. 
149. Id. at 635. 
150. Id. at 636. 
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In response to the claims that Dale threatens antidiscrimination laws gener-
ally, a number of scholars have looked to Justice O’Connor’s commercial-
expressive distinction. Dale Carpenter and Seana Shiffrin have offered the most 
extensive defenses of that approach.151 The commercial-expressive distinction, 
Carpenter argues, “preserves valuable associational freedom while saving anti-
discrimination law from constitutional invalidation in the areas where equality 
guarantees are most critically needed—employment and similar predominantly 
commercial arenas.”152 Shiffrin, who is troubled by Dale but largely defends 
Justice O’Connor’s Roberts concurrence, similarly argues for drawing “an im-
portant distinction between social associations and business associations or as-
sociations that significantly operate as parts of the competitive economy.”153 
Shiffrin argues that the former class of associations should have “a nearly abso-
lute right . . . to exclude unwanted members,” while the latter should not.154 
Like Carpenter, she argues that the commercial-noncommercial distinction ap-
propriately balances associational and nondiscrimination interests: 
First, regulation to promote inclusive membership practices is justified when 
applied to associations whose primary purpose is participation in the commer-
cial milieu because of the central importance of fair access to material re-
sources and mechanisms of power. Second, because such associations operate 
within a highly competitive marketplace and have a fairly focused singular 
purpose whose pursuit is largely guided by this competitive context and aim of 
profitable operation, these associations do not function in a context that is like-
ly to be conducive to the free, sincere, uninhibited, and undirected social inter-
action and consideration of ideas and ways of life.155 
But the expressive-commercial distinction is not a stable one, for at least 
three reasons. First, though Dale contains some language noting the “extreme[] 
br[eadth]” of New Jersey’s public accommodations law,156 nothing in the 
Court’s analysis turned on the law’s application to a noncommercial entity. Se-
cond, the line between expression and commerce is conceptually indistinct. 
Much, if not all, commercial activity is also expressive. As Rubenfeld notes, 
businesses “engage in expressive activity”157 in a variety of settings: “in their 
commercial advertising, in their choice of what to sell, and in their hiring prac-
tices.”158 In all of these actions, a business will often self-consciously seek to 
transmit a message about what sort of person buys its goods or services. Car-
penter and Shiffrin concede that there are hard cases in which it will be difficult 
 
151. See Carpenter, supra note 88, at 1517; Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Essay, What Is 
Really Wrong with Compelled Association?, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 839, 841 (2005). 
152. Carpenter, supra note 88, at 1518. 
153. Shiffrin, supra note 151, at 876. 
154. See id. at 875-76. 
155. Id. at 877. 
156. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 657 (2000). 
157. Rubenfeld, supra note 139, at 812 (quoting Dale, 530 U.S. at 655). 
158. Id. 
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to determine whether to treat a given organization as expressive or commer-
cial.159 But given the conceptual overlap between the categories, a court’s deci-
sion to place an organization in one category or the other is less likely to repre-
sent a principled application of a clear definition than a court’s background 
views about the relative importance of nondiscrimination and free association. 
This brings me to a third problem with the commercial-expressive distinc-
tion. To the extent that its supporters have offered a defense of the distinction, 
they have, like Carpenter and Shiffrin, defended it as resulting from a balancing 
of the interest in associational freedom against the interest in avoiding discrim-
ination. But there is no obvious reason why that balance fits perfectly within 
the line between commercial and expressive activities—even if we could figure 
out where that line fell. The more strongly one believes in the value of free as-
sociation, the more likely one is to think that an exemption from the anti-
discrimination principle for even some classes of commercial businesses is tol-
erable. At the limit, one might take Epstein’s position that “the state has no in-
terest in counteracting discrimination by private associations that do not pos-
sess monopoly power”—whether those associations are commercial or 
noncommercial.160 After all, if an individual who is discriminated against has 
somewhere else to turn for her goods or services, how could the desire to open 
up economic opportunities for her justify the impingement on free association? 
Once we are balancing associational and nondiscrimination interests as Carpen-
ter and Shiffrin are, it is very difficult to cabin the associational-freedom prin-
ciple to noncommercial entities. 
C. Current Challenges to the Expressive-Commercial Distinction 
I argued in the previous Subpart that the expressive-commercial distinction 
is an untenable one. And, indeed, the instability of the distinction has become 
more and more apparent. In this Subpart, I discuss two recent legal develop-
ments that press on the distinction. First, in a series of state-law public accom-
modations cases brought against businesses that have refused to serve same-sex 
couples’ weddings or commitment ceremonies, for-profit businesses have ar-
gued that their goods or services are inherently expressive and that the First 
Amendment negative-speech doctrine thus precludes application of public ac-
 
159. See Carpenter, supra note 88, at 1576-80; Shiffrin, supra note 151, at 879. 
160. Epstein, supra note 126, at 120. Epstein elaborates that position in his contribution 
to this Symposium and acknowledges that the expressive-commercial line is shaky at best. 
See Epstein, supra note 23, at 1277-78. For an example of another scholar taking a similar 
monopoly-power position, see John D. Inazu, The Unsettling “Well-Settled” Law of Free-
dom of Association, 43 CONN. L. REV. 149, 205 (2010) (“In my view, the protections for as-
sembly ought to be constrained when a private group wields so much power in a given situa-
tion—as private groups did in the American South from the decades following the Civil War 
to the end of the Civil Rights Era—that it prevents other groups from meaningfully pursuing 
their own visions of pluralism and dissent.”). 
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commodations laws to them. Second, a number of for-profit corporations have 
challenged the Affordable Care Act’s so-called “contraception mandate” as 
violating their own or their owners’ religious rights under the First Amendment 
and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. 
These developments—one inside and one outside of the public accommo-
dations context—threaten to eliminate any expressive-commercial distinction. 
If that is right, then the strategic retreat by libertarian opponents of public ac-
commodations laws seems to have worked. The property-and-contract objec-
tion to public accommodations laws that Bork and others pressed in the 1960s 
was politically vulnerable in a post-Lochner world. But First Amendment ar-
guments have remained resonant across the political spectrum. By withdrawing 
from the vulnerable ground of property and contract to the more politically 
congenial ground of the First Amendment—and by directing their objections, 
in the first instance, at laws that do not focus on race discrimination—
libertarian skeptics have put themselves in a position to threaten even the core 
applications of public accommodations laws. 
As in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, the application of state public ac-
commodations laws to prohibit sexual orientation discrimination has provided a 
key context for the development of these challenges. In Elane Photography, 
LLC v. Willock,161 the New Mexico Supreme Court addressed a case in which a 
photography company refused to photograph a same-sex commitment ceremo-
ny. Although the company sold its photographic services to the public general-
ly, its co-owner and lead photographer opposed same-sex marriage and refused 
to “photograph any image or event that violates her religious beliefs.”162 New 
Mexico law prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation by pub-
lic accommodations.163 When the New Mexico Human Rights Commission 
found Elane Photography liable for violating that law, the company challenged 
the ruling in state court. The company argued, among other things, that apply-
ing the public accommodations law to it violated its First Amendment free 
speech rights.164 
Although the New Mexico Supreme Court rejected Elane Photography’s 
First Amendment free speech claim,165 that claim deserves close analysis, for 
businesses subject to public accommodations laws will surely raise similar ar-
guments in the future. Notably, after Elane Photography petitioned the U.S. 
Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, Dale Carpenter filed an amicus brief 
 
161. 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1787 (2014). 
162. Id. at 59-60. 
163. In the New Mexico Supreme Court, Elane Photography did not deny that it was a 
public accommodation. See id. at 60-61. 
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(joined by the Cato Institute and Eugene Volokh) in support of the company.166 
Because that brief, filed by a leading exponent of the expressive-commercial 
distinction, in fact highlights the instability of that distinction, I focus particular 
attention on its argument. 
In arguing that application of the New Mexico public accommodations law 
was unconstitutional, Elane Photography and its amici exploited a key ambigui-
ty in the expressive-commercial distinction: what if a for-profit commercial en-
tity sells a good or service that is itself expressive? The company and its amici 
essentially argued that when the expressive and commercial categories overlap, 
it is expression that dominates—and the First Amendment accordingly bars ap-
plication of a public accommodations law. Because photography is an expres-
sive activity, they said, it would violate the First Amendment to require even a 
commercial photographer to take pictures of an event to which its owners ob-
jected.167 The company and its amici urged that this result followed from a 
straightforward application of the Supreme Court’s negative-speech prece-
dents.168 Forcing a photography company to take pictures its owners do not 
wish to take, they argued, is forcing the company to engage in unwanted ex-
pression—just like the individuals forced to express New Hampshire’s message 
of “Live Free or Die” on their license plates.169 
Although this argument does give some commercial businesses a First 
Amendment defense to the application of public accommodations laws, Elane 
Photography and its amici insisted that the constitutional constraints on those 
laws would be limited. In particular, the amici argued that First Amendment 
protection would “extend[] only to people who are being compelled to engage 
in expression.”170 Yet this line is not as “clear and administrable”171 as they 
suggested. The amici argued that “[u]nder Wooley, photographers’ First 
Amendment freedom of expression protects their right to choose which photo-
graphs to create,” but “caterers, hotels, and limousine companies do not have 
such a right to refuse to deliver food, rent out rooms, or provide livery services, 
 
166. See Brief of Amici Curiae Cato Inst., Eugene Volokh, & Dale Carpenter in Sup-
port of Petitioner, Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 134 S. Ct. 1787 (2014) (No. 13-585), 
2013 WL 6665006 [hereinafter Carpenter Brief]. 
167. See Elane Photography, 309 P.3d at 66 (“Elane Photography argues that because 
the service it provides is photography, and because photography is expressive, ‘some of [the] 
images will inevitably express the messages inherent in [the] event.’ In essence, then, Elane 
Photography argues that by limiting its ability to choose its clients, the [New Mexico Human 
Rights Act] forces it to produce photographs expressing its clients’ messages even when the 
messages are contrary to Elane Photography’s beliefs.” (alterations in original)). 
168. See id. at 64 (noting Elane Photography’s reliance on Wooley v. Maynard, 430 
U.S. 705 (1977), and West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 
(1943)). 
169. See Wooley, 430 U.S. at 713. 
170. Carpenter Brief, supra note 166, at 17. 
171. Id. at 18. 
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respectively, for use in same-sex commitment ceremonies.”172 That is because, 
they said, photography is expression but catering and so forth are not.173 
But that is a bit coy. As anyone who has ever hired a caterer for a wedding, 
bar mitzvah, or other occasion knows, catering has inevitably expressive ele-
ments. It is common for chefs to describe their food as “art” and “creations.”174 
And the presentation of food at an event typically expresses a message deemed 
appropriate to the event—be it celebratory (as at a graduation) or somber (as at 
a funeral). Hotels that host weddings often do more than provide a room for the 
ceremony; they set up and decorate the space in undeniably expressive ways. 
Even limousine companies often write “Just Married” on the cars that carry 
newlywed couples. If the fact that the service provided by a business incorpo-
rates an expressive element is sufficient to create a First Amendment defense 
against the application of a public accommodations law, then all of these busi-
nesses should have a First Amendment defense to a law that prohibits them 
from discriminating against customers on the basis of sexual orientation—or 
race, or any other group status, for that matter. Not surprisingly, a cake shop 
that refused to serve a same-sex couple’s wedding recently responded to allega-
tions that it violated a state public accommodations law by making an argument 
that was identical to Elane Photography’s.175 And in Elane Photography, the 
New Mexico Supreme Court itself cited examples of another cake shop and a 
florist that asserted that their First Amendment rights protected them against 
liability for refusing to serve gay couples.176  
More generally, any business’s provision of a good or service to someone 
on an equal basis with others can always be characterized as expressive. The 
provision of the good or service expresses the message, at the least, that the 
customer is entitled to be treated like any other customer.177 The statement of 
Elane Photography’s co-owner—that she would not photograph an event that 
violates her religious beliefs—suggests that it was the refusal to send that mes-
sage that motivated her objection to the application of the public accommoda-
tions law. If the First Amendment prohibits for-profit businesses that offer their 
goods and services to the public from being required to send messages they do 
not want to send, then it is difficult to see a principled basis for limiting that 
prohibition to cases in which the good or service the business sells is itself ex-
 
172. Id. at 17. 
173. See id. 
174. See Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 71 (N.M. 2013) (“Bakeries 
also offer services for hire, and wedding cakes are famously intricate and artistic.”), cert. 
denied, 134 S. Ct. 1787 (2014). 
175. See Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., No. CR 2013-0008 (Colo. Civ. Rights 
Comm’n Dec. 6, 2013) (ALJ), available at https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/ 
assets/initial_decision_case_no._cr_2013-0008.pdf, aff’d, No. CR 2013-0008 (Colo. Civ. 
Rights Comm’n May 30, 2014) (final agency order), available at https://www.aclu.org/sites/ 
default/files/assets/masterpiece_--_commissions_final_order.pdf. 
176. See Elane Photography, 309 P.3d at 71. 
177. See supra note 139 and accompanying text. 
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pressive. Even when a business is selling nothing but motor oil, an antidiscrim-
ination law will force it to send a message that it may not want to send. Once 
we expand the “expressive” zone to include for-profit businesses that sell their 
goods or services to the public, it becomes clear that the expressive-commercial 
distinction cannot be counted on to cabin Dale’s constitutional exemption from 
public accommodations laws. 
The Cato, Volokh, and Carpenter amicus brief argued that the “line be-
tween expression and nonexpressive behavior” can be readily drawn by refer-
ence to existing First Amendment cases.178 If a business’s “activity may be 
banned, limited only to certain narrow classes of people, or subjected to discre-
tionary licensing,” amici contended, it would not violate the First Amendment 
to apply antidiscrimination laws to that activity.179 But if the activity “is pro-
tected by the First Amendment against a ban, for instance because it involves 
writing or photography,” they argued, applying antidiscrimination laws to it 
would violate the First Amendment.180 
But that conclusion does not follow from the premise. Crucially, the amici 
failed to take account of the accepted doctrinal distinction between laws that 
target speech for regulation and neutral laws that do not single out expressive 
activity.181 The First Amendment prohibits an ordinance that requires newspa-
per racks, and only newspaper racks, to obtain a discretionary permit from local 
officials before being placed on the sidewalk.182 But the First Amendment does 
not prohibit an ordinance that requires all vending machines to obtain a discre-
tionary permit before being placed on the sidewalk—nor does it prohibit en-
forcement of that general ordinance against a newspaper company that places 
its machines on the sidewalk without the required permit.183 That is true even 
though enforcing the permit ordinance against the noncompliant newspaper has 
the effect of limiting expression. Being in the business of selling speech does 
not grant a general First Amendment immunity from the application of neutral 
laws, “unrelated to expression,” that have an effect on speech.184 So too in the 
Elane Photography case, the application of the public accommodations law 
may have the effect of requiring the photography company to engage in expres-
sion against its will, but that is only because of the application of the generally 
applicable rule prohibiting any business that opens itself up to the public from 
discriminating against potential customers based on their sexual orientation.185 
 
178. Carpenter Brief, supra note 166, at 18. 
179. Id. 
180. Id. at 18-19. 
181. See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmen-
tal Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 491 (1996) (calling this “a 
distinction as important as any in First Amendment law”). 
182. See City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 759-60 (1988). 
183. See id. at 760-61. 
184. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 567 (2001). 
185. See Rubenfeld, supra note 139, at 809. 
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Because the First Amendment does not give businesses that exist to sell speech 
any presumptive immunity from generally applicable laws that have an effect 
on expression, and because any business could legitimately claim that the ap-
plication of public accommodations laws to it forces it to send a message, it is 
difficult to see how the argument in the Cato, Volokh, and Carpenter amicus 
brief could be readily cabined to those for-profit corporations that are specifi-
cally “expressive.” 
The amicus brief also highlights the malleability of the balancing approach 
that underlies Carpenter’s and Shiffrin’s academic defenses of the expressive-
commercial distinction. The brief emphasizes the large number of wedding 
photographers in the United States, estimating that “even a town of 50,000 
people would likely contain over 15 wedding photographers,” most of whom 
“would likely be happy to take the money of anyone who comes to them.”186 
Because of these likely alternative sources of the service, the brief argues, sex-
ual orientation discrimination by wedding photographers imposes “compara-
tively little cost” on its victims.187 The brief distinguishes that situation from 
the case of race discrimination at the time the Civil Rights Act was enacted, ac-
knowledging that “[d]iscrimination in many places of public accommodation 
has been historically pervasive, to the point that mixed-race groups might have 
been unable to find any suitable hotel or restaurant.”188 As I have argued in the 
previous two Subparts, it is but a short step from this position to one that would 
invalidate any public accommodations law that reaches beyond businesses with 
monopoly power.189 
The contraception mandate cases190 are somewhat further removed from 
the context that is my principal interest in this Essay. After all, those cases do 
not involve public accommodations statutes; they involve a regulation of em-
ployer-provided insurance that the federal government imposed pursuant to the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA).191 And they do not rest 
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190. See, e.g., Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of the U.S. Dep’t of Health 
& Human Servs., 724 F.3d 377 (3d Cir.), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013); Hobby Lobby 
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191. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of the U.S. Code). The ACA requires health insurance plans to provide, without cost 
sharing, certain preventive services, including preventive care and screening “as provided for 
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primarily on constitutional challenges to the application of the ACA in any 
event. Rather, they principally rest on the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
of 1993 (RFRA).192 RFRA provides, as a rule of construction, that federal stat-
utes will not be interpreted to impose substantial burdens on religious exercise 
unless doing so is the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling inter-
est.193 The employers in these cases are private corporations owned by individ-
uals who have a religious opposition to contraception that works by preventing 
the implantation of a fertilized egg. They argue that, by requiring their health 
coverage to pay for contraceptive methods that they believe prevent implanta-
tion, the ACA imposes a substantial burden on their religious beliefs.194  
RFRA does not constrain state laws195—including state antidiscrimination 
laws—and an expanded federal public accommodations law could override it. 
Perhaps most important, the religious exercise issues presented in these cases 
do not necessarily say anything about whether a business could maintain a First 
Amendment defense to the application of public accommodations laws when its 
owner objected to serving a particular class of customers for nonreligious rea-
sons. Nonetheless, one potential outcome of the challenges to the contraception 
mandate is the further erosion of the already-flimsy commercial-expressive dis-
tinction. A crucial premise of the challenges is that secular, for-profit corpora-
tions can be a vehicle for the religious exercise of their shareholders and that 
regulation of those corporations can thus violate rights to free exercise of reli-
gion. For the mandate’s challengers to prevail, then, there must be no commer-
cial-expressive distinction under RFRA. 
And, indeed, that is precisely what the Tenth Circuit held in its decision 
ruling for the challengers in Hobby Lobby. The Tenth Circuit considered the 
lack of an expressive-commercial distinction to be a matter of simple logic: if 
“individuals may incorporate for religious purposes and keep their Free Exer-
cise rights, and unincorporated individuals may pursue profit while keeping 
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their Free Exercise rights,” then surely for-profit corporations that pursue profit 
must retain free exercise rights.196 One plus one equals two. And the court ex-
plained its rejection of an expressive-commercial distinction in terms that 
would seem to apply equally to First Amendment free speech and free associa-
tion claims. The court emphasized that “religious conduct includes religious 
expression” and that such expression “can be communicated by individuals and 
for-profit corporations alike.”197 Indeed, the Tenth Circuit explained, the two 
for-profit corporations before it engaged in significant religious expression “by 
purchasing hundreds of newspaper ads to ‘know Jesus as Lord and Savior.’”198 
For-profit corporations also engage in nonreligious expression all the time.199 If 
a for-profit corporation has the same rights of religious expression as does a 
nonprofit corporation or an individual, it is difficult to explain why such a cor-
poration should not have the same rights of nonreligious expression. 
To be sure, the courts could say that ruling for the contraception mandate’s 
challengers would not undermine the expressive-commercial distinction in free 
speech or free association cases. After all, RFRA goes beyond what the First 
Amendment itself requires.200 But, until now, RFRA’s prophylaxis has been 
understood as extending broader protections to the entities that are already pro-
tected by the First Amendment—not as protecting a broader range of entities 
than does the First Amendment.201 And if the Supreme Court holds that secu-
lar, for-profit corporations have religious rights against the application of the 
ACA under RFRA, it is a very short leap to say that those corporations have 
speech and associational rights against the application of public accommoda-
tions laws under the First Amendment. Indeed, the latter conclusion may be 
true a fortiori. There is a plausible argument that religion, which involves per-
sonal belief, cannot be exercised by anyone other than a natural person or an 
association of such persons who join together for the specific purpose of engag-
ing in religious exercise.202 But it is easy to see how a for-profit corporation 
can engage in expression. And corporate expression is already understood as 
constitutionally protected in a variety of circumstances—including when a cor-
poration objects to being forced to express a particular message.203 The impli-
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cations of the contraception mandate cases for the public accommodations con-
text are therefore likely to be significant. 
Neither the public accommodations cases exemplified by Elane Photog-
raphy nor the contraception mandate cases yet touch the core of public accom-
modations law. They do, however, mark a tightening siege. If the courts extend 
First Amendment or RFRA protection to for-profit corporations in these cases, 
the expressive-commercial distinction’s potential to limit the risk posed by 
Dale will be substantially eroded. And libertarian opponents of public accom-
modations statutes will be well positioned to continue the stepwise efforts to 
contain, and indeed roll back, the penetration of the antidiscrimination norm 
into what was previously considered the “private” or “social” sphere. 
CONCLUSION 
In this Essay, I have argued that the apparent consensus surrounding public 
accommodations law is illusory. Although libertarian opponents have given up 
the effort to undertake a frontal assault against Title II of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, they have engaged in what is merely a strategic retreat. By avoiding an 
attack on Title II itself, and by relying on First Amendment arguments rather 
than those based on property or contract, skeptics of public accommodations 
laws have put themselves in a position to potentially block further expansion of 
those laws—and even to threaten their core applications. Although these skep-
tics’ arguments take a different form than the arguments of opponents of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1875—focusing on freedom of association rather than the 
civil-rights/social-rights distinction—they implicate precisely the same con-
cerns as did the arguments raised against public accommodations laws during 
the Reconstruction and civil rights eras. Neither the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
nor the Supreme Court decisions upholding prohibitions on private discrimina-
tion have settled the conflict over how deeply the antidiscrimination norm may 
properly penetrate into previously “social” spheres. That conflict will remain 
for the foreseeable future.  
 
